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Framing Xenophobia on Social 
Media: An Analysis of Xenophobic 




This study examines mis-and disinformation concerning xenophobic attacks on 
Nigerians living in South Africa in 2017 and 2019. The study uses narrative theories 
and netnograhpy involving thematic content analysis and focus group discussions 
with undergraduate university students, youths and adults across the three domi-
nant regions of Nigeria. The study answers the question: what motivates Nigerians 
to share mis-and disinformation concerning xenophobic attacks against Nigerians 
living in South Africa on social media? The findings of this study suggest that 
national solidarity is an overriding motivation for sharing mis-and disinformation 
about xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa on social media.
Keywords: Xenophobia, national solidarity, social media, Nigeria, South Africa, 
reprisal attacks, tensions
1. Introduction
The Nigerian rumour mill is usually on overdrive. It is an industry that is resil-
ient and immune from the vagaries of the Nigerian political and economic climate 
(Odunfa [1]). The affordances of digital technology have, in no small measure, 
contributed in weaponizing the Nigerian rumour mill. Now, rumours, misinforma-
tion, disinformation and half-truths travel at the speed of light and reach a wider 
audience. This is the case of xenophobic attacks against Nigerians living in South 
Africa in 2017 and 2019 in which rumours, mis-and disinformation resulted in 
reprisal attacks on South African businesses in Nigeria. A typical example of how 
the Nigerian rumour mill works is the story of a Nigerian, who was among those 
that attacked South African-owned Shoprite at The Palms Mall in Lagos, Nigeria. 
When the young man was asked why he joined others to attack Shoprite and other 
South African businesses in Nigeria, he responded that xenophobia, a Nigerian 
living in South Africa had been killed by South Africans. Hence, attacking South 
African businesses was the only way he could get even with the death of xenophobia 
in South Africa. Even though this story has not been verified, it goes to show the 
potency of mis-and disinformation and how it could have adverse impact on the 
government-to-government as well as people-to-people relations between two 
countries. For instance, mis-and disinformation has been identified as factors 
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responsible for reprisals attacks against South African businesses in other African 
countries (Osuagwu & Elebeke [2]; Somdyala [3]). Chenzi [4], p. 3 explained that 
“foreign nationals residing in South Africa share content with their relations who 
reside outside South Africa about their xenophobic experiences.” He emphasised 
that the social media content these foreigners often share about xenophobic vio-
lence in South Africa at times, turn out to be misinformation, leading to reprisal 
attacks [4]. However, there is limited academic investigation into the  motivation 
for sharing mis-and disinformation concerning xenophobic attacks against 
Nigerians living in South Africa on social media. This chapter provides an insight 
into factor (s) influencing Nigerians to share mis-and disinformation concerning 
xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South. The finding has both academic 
and policy relevance for the literature on mis-and disinformation as well as South 
Africa-Nigerian relations.
2. Background
Xenophobia has attracted widespread attention within and without the aca-
demic community. The reason is obvious; it is considered an anomaly that foreign-
ers, particularly Africans, would face the magnitude of hatred that Xenophobia 
spews. The first major xenophobic outbreak in post-1994 South Africa happened 
on 11 May 2008 and there have several other outbreaks of violence against foreign-
ers in South Africa. While recent incidents may not be of the same magnitude 
as the incident of 11 May 2008, its recurrence points to a troubling relationship 
between locals and foreigners. For instance, on 30 May 2013, 25-year-old Abdi 
Nasir Mahmoud Good, was stoned to death in Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape, South 
Africa. The violence was captured on a mobile phone and shared on the Internet.1 
Again, on 7 June 2014, a Somali national was stoned to death and two others were 
seriously injured when an angry mob of locals attacked their shops in Mamelodi, 
South Africa. Three more Somalis were wounded by gunshots and their shops were 
looted.2 In April 2015, there was an upsurge in xenophobic attacks throughout the 
country. The attacks started in Durban and spread to Johannesburg. Zulu King 
Goodwill Zwelithini was accused of igniting the attacks with his remarks that 
foreigners’ resident in the country “should go back to their countries.”3 In October 
2015 the serene town of Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape recorded an outbreak 
of xenophobic attacks on foreigners. According to the news report, more than 500 
people were displaced and more than 300 shops and homes looted. Muslims were 
identified as the target of the attacks.4 While South Africa witnessed a modicum of 
peace after the Grahamstown xenophobia outbreak, it ruptured in February 2017 
when another xenophobia outbreak was recorded in Pretoria, South Africa. The 
incident took a new turn on 24 February 2017 when a large-scale anti-immigration 
protest suspected to have official approval, according to the Nelson Mandela 
Foundation, erupted in the capital city of Pretoria.5 The Protesters marched 
to the Foreign Ministry and handed a petition to government representatives. 
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and complained that “they are arrogant and they don’t know how to talk to people, 
especially Nigerians.” The February xenophobia outbreak affected many Nigerians 
resident in Pretoria, who the locals accused of being “arrogant and don’t know how 
to talk to people.”6 However, xenophobic attacks on Nigerians in South Africa esca-
lated in 2019 resulting in the repatriation of more than 600 Nigerians, who were 
flown home aboard Nigeria’s Air Peace.7 Both incidents resulted in reprisal attacks 
in Nigeria but it was more fatal in 2019 resulting in the closure of the South African 
High Commission, South African-owned Telco, MTN, Shoprite and other South 
African businesses in Nigeria.8 Even though the repatriation of Nigerians from 
South Africa incited reprisal attacks, it was mis-and disinformation on social media 
that worsened it and stoked tensions between South Africa and Nigerian relations. 
Hassan and Hitchen [5], p. 3 show that in Nigeria, disinformation is most effective 
when it draws on existing narratives and contexts to sharpen existing social divides 
and aimed at “delegitimising institutions, groups or personalities, glorifying a 
leader or, during elections, confusing voters, instigating apathy or marginalising 
women and other vulnerable groups.”
3. Xenophobia or Afrophobia?
The occurrence of xenophobic violence has become a feature of the lived 
realities of foreigners who reside in South Africa. Xenophobia has been defined as 
a hatred for foreigners (Steenkamp [6]; Williams [7]). However, Harris [8], p. 2, 
contends that Xenophobia extends beyond hatred; rather, it should be redefined 
to “incorporate practice” because it is not just a “dislike or fear of foreigners but a 
violent practice that results in bodily harm and damage” [8].
The South African Migration Project (SAMP) identified several factors respon-
sible for the outbreak of xenophobic violence. Some of these include isolation, 
relative deprivation, Nation Building, Public and official discourse, Legislative and 
policy Frameworks, Human Rights Education, Data and Information, Public and 
Officials Discourse, Opportunities for Interaction, Going beyond the Debate(s), 
Peer Education, and Establishing a Network (Crush et al. [9]). For his part, Harris 
[8] identified three hypotheses responsible for the occurrence of xenophobia in 
South Africa including the Scapegoating hypothesis; the isolation hypothesis and 
the biocultural hypothesis. However, the perception of African migrants as the 
economic threats has been identified as a major causative factor in the occurrence of 
xenophobic violence [9]. This was highlighted in the SAMP survey of 2006, which 
noted that attitudes towards foreigners as a national threat to the economic well-
being of South Africans have hardened. For instance, the survey result showed that 
“the proportion of South Africans arguing that foreign nationals use up resources 
grew by 8% from 59% in 1999 to 67% in 2006. Furthermore, the survey also high-
lighted that migrants are being increasingly associated with crime rising from 45% 
in 1 1999 to 67% in 2006 as did the idea that migrants bring disease 24% in 1 1999 to 
49% in 2006” [9], p. 3.
On the other hand, xenophobia does not apply to all categories of foreigners in 
South Africa. Black Africans bear the brunt of xenophobic violence outbreak in 
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certain categories. The major targets of xenophobic attacks in South Africa are black 
migrants, who are perceived as economic threat to black South Africans. Therefore, 
the incidences of xenophobia in South Africa could be majorly considered as 
“Afrophobia” because it is majorly targeted at African migrants’ resident in the 
country.
Unfortunately, this contradicts the role of other Africans nations during the 
apartheid era when South African exiles were accommodated and educated in 
other African countries [6]. During this period, several high profile South African 
political leaders took shelter in other African countries, where they were accom-
modated, supported and encouraged to sustain the struggle against the Apartheid 
government in South Africa. For instance, Thambo Mbeki was posted to Nigeria 
as Deputy head of the ANC’s Department of Information and Propaganda. 
Additionally, many Nigerians were taxed to provide assistance to the ANC-led 
struggle against apartheid. In fact, it is estimated that the Nigerian government 
provided an annual subvention of $5million to the ANC and the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC) to aid the struggle against the Apartheid regime at the time.
4. Theoretical framework
Prinsloo [10], p. 130, explains that narrative is universal because it is “recognised 
as crossing all social and cultural divides.” Narrative is, therefore, a sense-making 
mechanism for understanding the real world (Fiske [11]; Wigston [12]). This 
study draws on structuralist approach to narrative analysis, which combines the 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic. Prinsloo [10], p. 133, explains that “the syntagmatic 
type of analysis identifies and describes the structure of formal organisation of 
the text following the chronological order or the linear sequence of the narrative 
while a paradigmatic type of analysis seeks to identify the deeper latent patterns or 
organisations which underpin the story.” Hence, a combination of syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic “approaches enable questions of positioning and power to be posed” 
(Prinsloo [10], p. 157). Also, structuralism “relies on binary opposition in order to 
transfer meanings in the easiest way because we make sense of concepts and ideas 
by contrasting them with their opposites [12], p. 142. Levi-Strauss explains that 
when “two characters are opposed in binary structure, their symbolic meaning is 
virtually forced to be both general and easily accessible because of the simplicity of 
the difference between them” [12], p. 152. Explaining further, Wigston [12], p. 154, 
pointed out that Levi-Strauss is not “interested in the sequential development of the 
narrative, but rather in the relationships between the various characters and their 
settings and hence, binary opposition then provide us with a means of undertak-
ing a paradigmatic analysis of a text where we can determine these relationships.” 
Therefore, by analysing the binary oppositions in a text we can “uncover the ideo-
logical and manipulative structure of the values embodied in that message” as well 
as “reveal deep structures below the surface of the message that are not immediately 
clear but are implied in every opposition” [12], p. 172.
This study draws on Propp and Todorov narratives theories. Propp’s model like 
Todorov’s provides a means of identifying the conventional narrative structure 
in a text. While Propp and Todorov models are useful for comparing text, other 
analytical devices such as Levi-Strauss binary opposition is needed to gain deeper 
insight into the structure of a text [13]. Hence, this study combines Propp and 
Todorov narrative theories to analyse the framing of the February 2017 and August 
2019 xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa on social media. This 
chapter is concerned with the narrative of xenophobia on social media and how it 
influences emotion, rational and sentiments among Nigerians [10], p. 130.
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4.1 Social media and fake news
The affordances of digital technology have resulted in the rise of mis-and 
disinformation with dire consequences for truth and credibility of the media 
(Wasserman [13]; Schifferes et al., [14]). Wasserman and Benequista [15], p. 35, 
explain that the “ease with which media can be produced online has made it possible 
for rumours, untruths, and disinformation to spread and threaten the credibility 
of the news media.” The use of social media to manipulate public opinion has 
become a global challenge and sub-Saharan Africa is not an exemption. The role 
of Cambridge Analytica in election manipulation in Kenya and Nigeria is a pointer 
to this reality (Granville [16]). For instance, it is estimated that “organized social 
media manipulation has more than doubled since 2017, with 70 countries using 
computational propaganda to manipulate public opinion” (Howard and Bradshaw 
[17]). This has adversely impacted the average level of trust in the news across all 
countries (Nielsen et al. [18]). Even leading religious leaders such as Pope Francis of 
the Catholic Church has acknowledged fake news is a “very serious sin.”9 Chenzi [4] 
explained that “fake social media content about the xenophobic violence in South 
Africa is one of the triggers of reprisal attacks against South African businesses and 
nationals in other parts of Africa [4]. This is because most the content they share 
with their loved ones back in their home countries are likely to be “fake news lead-
ing to reprisal attacks” (Chenzi, [4], p. 3). This study examines the motivations for 
sharing mis-and disinformation concerning Xenophobic attacks against Nigerians 
living in South Africa on social media.
5. Methodology
This study is a netnograhpy involving a thematic analysis and focus group 
discussions. It uses narrative theories, thematic content analysis and focus group 
discussions with undergraduates and postgraduate students, adults under 40 and 
adults above 40. The two complementary methodologies enabled the author to 
collect comprehensive information on the motivation for sharing mis-and disinfor-
mation concerning xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa (Sade-
Beck [19], p. 49). In a netnograhpy three categories of data are recognised including 
archival data, elicited data, and fieldnote data (Kozinets [20], p. 4). This study uses 
archival data from messages posted on xenophobic attacks against Nigerians living 
in South Africa on Twitter and Facebook. First, the study developed a codebook 
for categorising Propp’s seven characters (see Table 1). Second, a total of 581 
Facebook posts were harvested manually in relation the xenophobia outbreak of 
February 2017. Furthermore, the study focused on Facebook accounts with more 
than 2000 followers. This reduced the number of Facebook accounts to 100. These 
accounts were further coded using Google form. The Twitter analysis focused on 
the tweets of @JJ Omojuwa, who is regarded as a social media influencer in Nigeria. 
@Omojuwa is a known public opinion moulder, who also works as a consultant and 
runs a foundation. He is highly regarded within the Nigerian social media space. 
His Twitter account is also verified evincing his status as a social media celebrity in 
Nigeria. @Omojuwa has 560,000 followers on Twitter, which makes him a major 
influencer of events in Nigeria and Africa at large. The Twitter analysis is focused 
on the debate ignited on Twitter by @Omojuwa’s tweet on the February 2017 
Xenophobia outbreak. @Omojuwa’s tweets were also selected because he travelled to 
South Africa within the period of the February 2017 xenophobia outbreak and was 
9 https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2016/1208/Why-Pope-Francis-says-fake-news-is-a-sin
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asked for detailed identification by South African border police, which resulted in 
his being delayed for a few hours. Rather than frame his tweet on this incident as an 
immigration issue, @Omojuwa framed it as a continuation of xenophobic attacks on 
Nigeria.
Second, A total of eight focus group discussions were held across the three 
dominant regions of Nigeria. Each of the focus group discussions lasted between 
50 and 90 minutes and were conducted in English. In instances where the Nigerian 
colloquial English was used it was translated to English language. A total of 68 
participants joined the discussion in groups ranging from 8 to 10. The discussion 
guide was structured around five sections, each containing a list of key questions 
to be asked in all focus groups, and a set of additional questions to be asked at the 
discretion of discussion facilitator.
6. Analysis
An analysis of the Facebook posts and tweets suggest there are five broad themes 
that dominated social media framing of xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in 
South Africa. The themes are: Retaliate, Lazy and ungrateful, Jealous and inhuman, 
Irresponsible government, South Africans are barbaric.
7. Thematic analysis
The thematic analysis focused on a few accounts on Facebook and Twitter. 
The accounts were selected for relevance and reach. Three accounts were selected 
purposively including @Engr.Chris Moore, AY COMEDIA, and YAW on Facebook 
and @JJ Omojuwa on Twitter.
Engr. Chris Moore’s profile on Facebook describes him as a former system admin-
istrator, who lives in Milan, Italy. He is followed by 2138 people on Facebook. On 18 
March 2017, he posted the following message on his Facebook wall:
Fellow Nigerians please, stay away from South Africa because of their xenophobic 
attacks on Nigerians in their country. Please, travel to countries that can at least 
protect your human right. Please, keep sharing to keep our citizens from travelling 
to such country.
This post was accompanied by five gory pictures. Four of the pictures were from 
the 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa. The fifth picture was from a scene 
Entries Categorisation
South Africans are evil, south Africans are jealous of Nigerians, South Africans are 
lazy, they are ungrateful for the role Nigerians played in ending apartheid
Villain
Nigerians are victims of South African wickedness, jealousy Princess
Seeks peace and reconciliation between Nigeria and South Africa Hero
Portrays themselves as the hero seeking for the betterment of Nigerians but they are 
fuelling the conflicts by posting fake news
False hero
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of necklacing10 in Nigeria. This post was shared by 1596 people, liked by 82 people 
and attracted 124 comments on Facebook. While responding to comments to this 
message, @Engr.Chris Moore sustained this narrative with another post that “South 
African government is not doing anything to arrest the situation” but this is not 
true because about 136 South11 Africa protesters were arrested by the South African 
police on February 24 during the anti-immigrant protest in Pretoria.
The post by @ Engr. Chris Moore ignited widespread debate on Facebook about 
xenophobic attacks on Nigerians resident in South Africa. However, most of the 
debates were informed by alternative facts and stereotypes. This is because most 
of the participants in the debate are not resident in South Africa (see Figure 1) and 
relied on secondary sources. This was highlighted by some of the respondents, who 
pointed out that the pictures posted by @Engr. Chris Moore were old pictures that 
had been used elsewhere. For instance, @Ehis Ese confirmed that one of the pic-
tures was that of an armed robbery perpetrator that was necklaced in Warri, Delta 
State, Nigeria: “Dis guy was a thief and was burnt last year in estate roundabout 
in Warri, Delta state. I mean this particular guy but I don’t know about the rest” 
(Sic). @Oscarpedro Osagie also noted: “Wrong. This photograph was on before this 
incident”. Another respondent, @Mountain Omobaorun Ododo Omoleye, who is 
resident in South Africa also pointed that the pictures were not a true reflection of 
the incident of February 2017: “Hello people this post and the pictures, I have not 
seen this picture and the news here in South Africa, pls which path of South Africa 
did this happen” (Sic). A South African @Mapie Mhlangu queried why @Engr. 
Chris Moore was spreading fake news on Facebook: “But Why are you spreading 
fake news?”
AY COMEDIAN is a celebrated Nigerian comedian, whose Facebook account is 
a community. AY COMEDIAN lives in Lagos Nigeria and his Facebook community 
is followed by 4, 718,434 people. On 23 February 2017 AY COMEDIAN posted a 
picture of a man being mobbed by an angry crowd with the following message: 
“Xenophobia: Angry South Africans Mob Brutally Attack a Nigerian Man in SA.” 
The man that was being attacked cannot be identified through the picture because 
his face was not visible. How AY COMEDIAN knew that the man being attacked 
was a Nigerian demystifies human knowledge but the picture helped promote the 
narrative that South Africans were attacking Nigerians that are resident in South 
Africa. The source of this picture was given as gistvilla.co but this is a non-existent 
news site. This particular post was shared by 433 people, liked by 1400 and 
attracted 1200 comments. Another post by YAW, a leading Nigerian comedian and 
radio host also promoted the same narrative of xenophobia. YAW is a community 
on Facebook followed by 241, 455 people. On 27 February YAW posted a video on 
Facebook with the following message: “Another video of South African youths 
shooting a young man to death in the xenophobic attack has emerged. Watched the 
video below.” The source of the video was given as http://yawnaija.tv/xenophobic-
attacks-south-africa-2017/. First, the video in question was not produced in South 
Africa because the actors in the video spoke the Arabic language, which suggests it 
could have been in any of the Arabian countries in Africa. Secondly, the source of 
the video was traced to Yaw’s online news site which goes by his own name, http://
yawnaia.tv. However, this video was used to promote the xenophobic narrative that 
10 Necklacing. This is an approach to summary execution and torture by forcing tyre round the neck of 
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South Africans were attacking Nigerians resident in their countries. This post was 
shared by 46 people, liked by 54 and attracted 20 comments. Furthermore, YAW 
posted another three pictures with the message: “We are all foreigners somewhere.” 
Two of the pictures were from the 2008 xenophobic outbreak in South Africa but 
were used to frame the incident of February 2017.
On Twitter, the analysis is focused on @JJ Omojuwa’s tweet in response to the 
outbreak of xenophobia in South Africa. Omojuwa tweeted about the February 
xenophobia outbreak in South Africa on March 2 to his followers: “Xenophobia: 
Stop being ingrates-Thabo Mbeki.” This was former President Thambo Mbeki’s mes-
sage cautioning South Africans to replicate the friendliness that other African coun-
tries showed to South Africans during apartheid. The tweet attracted 62 retweets 
and 29 likes. After this post was made on March 2, @Omojuwa travelled to South 
Africa on March 4 and was asked by South African border Police to provide further 
details about his trip, which he could have done without attracting attention but it 
presented him an opportunity to promote the xenophobic narrative about South 
Africans. However, there were a few of @Omojuwa’s followers who saw through the 
attempt to frame an immigration issue as xenophobia. One of his followers with 
the handle @LuamboJT replied that it was all about Omojuwa’s arrogance: “my 
man, your arrogance will put you in danger some other days, last time I checked, 
no Nigerian has been killed in SA.” In another tweet, @LuamboJT cautioned @ 
Omojuwa that “the big issue to be addressed is your attitude my man, you don’t go to 
a foreign country and say things you were saying.”
8. Retaliate
The responses in this category urge Nigerians to retaliate against South Africans 
by either attacking their businesses in Nigeria such as MTN, Shoprite or attacking 
South Africans that are resident in Nigeria. A Facebook post by @Aniebonam Rusky 
Lotachukwu captures the majority of framing in this category. He responded to AY 
COMEDIAN’s post with the following message: “I swear the war has just begun.....
Nigerians gonna burn down any shop or business owned by South Africans since 
South Africans seem to be wise.....soon South Africa will fall like an ass and will 
be one of the poorest country because no country now is happy with their devilish 
behaviour” (Sic). Another Facebook response by @Juliet Nganwaozuzu reproduced 
the same narrative: “We should start killing all the South African people that are 
in Nigeria without mercy please enough is enough” (Sic). This category comprised 
38.7% (see Figure 2) of social media posts on the February xenophobia outbreak in 
South Africa. This suggests that Nigerians are in support of a reprisal attack in the 
face of xenophobic violence against Nigerians resident in South Africa.
Figure 1. 
Geographic location of social media handles.
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8.1 Lazy and ungrateful
Messages in this category suggest that South Africans are ungrateful for the help 
rendered to them by the Nigerian government during apartheid, when some of 
their citizens were sheltered in Nigeria. For instance, @Omoabass Kafayat Anifowose 
responded to AY COMEDIAN’s post that: “Just South Africans are ingrate so easy 
to forgetting the favour Nigeria did for them. We stood by their side and we fought 
for them. So to kill Nigerians is what to pay them back?” (Sic). Messages in this 
category comprise 13.3% (see Figure 2) of social media posts on the xenophobic 
violence of February 2017.
8.2 Jealous and inhumane
In this category, South Africans are framed as being jealous of Nigerians 
because they are hardworking and attract the attention of South African women. A 
Facebook post by @Allan Donann is representative of the framing in this category. 
He posted in response to @AY COMEDIAN’s post that: “I just can’t believe how a 
fellow black man will treat his fellow black man like this. This is absurd and inhu-
man. The lazy mind is a frustrated mind. Why blame your failures on hardwork-
ing people” (Sic). Another Facebook post by @Jayne Bahanack Betow responded 
thus: “I will say this loud and clear without mincing words and in all confidence....
These very lazy South Africans are super jealous of hardworking Nigerians....I am 
a Cameroonian and I witness how hardworking, consistent, smart and intelligent 
Nigerians are when it comes to business and other essential and lucrative things....
And we Cameroonians admire and respect them for that. Guess what? Many 
Cameroonians are beginning to learn from them.....so please South Africans enough 
of this hatred and jealousy instead try to learn from them” (Sic). This category 
comprises 2.7% (see Figure 2) of social media post on the xenophobic attack of 
February 2017.
8.3 Irresponsible government
The responses in this category frame the South African government as is respon-
sible and doing nothing to arrest the attacks on foreigners living in the country. For 
instance, @Olufemi Obembe posted that: “I feel that South African authorities are 
not responsible. They are supposed to protest lives and properties of everyone living 
in their territory, most especially foreigners” (Sic). This category comprises 29.3% 
(see Figure 2) of social media posts on the xenophobic outbreak of February 2017. 
This suggests that many Nigerians think that the South African government tacitly 
support xenophobic violence on Nigerians resident in their country.
Figure 2. 
Words used to describe south Africans.
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8.4 South Africans are barbaric
In this category, South Africans are framed as barbaric and wicked. For instance, 
@Tee Jay responded to AY COMEDIAN’s post that: “Being confronted by two South 
Africans before on the street and they said all Nigerians must die without saying 
anything to them; had to run for my life because they hold knife”. In the same 
vein, @YemmyOcean Ige responded to @Engr. Chris Moore thus: “Why are d South 
Africans bad minded as dis, it’s not right oooo, let all Nigerians there come back 
home oooo, Abeg” (Sic). This category comprises 16% (see Figure 2) of social 
media posts on the xenophobic violence of February 2017.
9. Interview analysis
9.1 Southwest under 40
The majority of participants in this category are likely to share misinforma-
tion on social media platforms if it involves the mistreatment of Nigerians in the 
diaspora as a means of group solidarity. This is evinced in the xenophobia out-
break in South Africa in 2019 when videos from the 2008 xenophobia attacks in 
South Africa were shared as that of 2019. This resulted in reprisal attacks on South 
African business interests in Nigeria. One participant in Lagos, Nigeria mentioned 
that she felt that sharing misinformation about xenophobic attacks on Nigerians 
living in South Africa amounted to doing good. This suggests that Nigerian youths 
are likely to share mis-and disinformation about xenophobic attacks on Nigerians 
living in South Africa is a way of expression national solidarity with Nigerian 
victims.
9.2 Northeast under 40
In the northern part of Nigeria, Participants under the age of forty are also 
likely to share fake news to show solidarity with Nigerians being maltreated in 
the Diaspora. One participant said he shared fake videos on the 2019 xenophobic 
attacks against Nigerians living in South Africa to make Nigerians know what was 
happening to fellow Nigerians in South Africa.
9.3 Northeast above 40
Also, for participants above 40 years of age in the northeast of Nigeria did not 
share misinformation on Xenophobic attacks against Nigerians because they felt it 
could result in reprisal attacks. So, most of the people in the age bracket of 40 years 
and above in the northern part of Nigeria are not likely to share such videos.,
9.4 Southeast above 40
In the southeast, the view that Nigerians are likely to share mis-and disinforma-
tion concerning xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa as a form 
of national solidarity is valid. Some participants said they shared videos from the 
xenophobia outbreak of 2008 when it reoccurred in 2019 leading to reprisal attacks 
in parts of Nigeria. One participant mentioned that he shared misinformation 
concerning Xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa but pulled it 
when he found out it was false:
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I have been a victim of sharing false news/information from people like the xeno-
phobia in South Africa. I got pictures of events that happened before that xeno-
phobia. I went as far as sharing it, but when I came back to verify the authenticity 
of the news, I discovered that those events had already happened long ago. So, it is 
false from my side, I pulled it down.
9.5 Nigerian students
Nigerian undergraduate students are also likely to share trending misinforma-
tion that has elements of patriotism and emotions. For example, participants 
shared fake news on the July 2019 xenophobic attacks on Nigerians resident in 
South Africa without verifying it. This is because the xenophobia outbreak in 
South Africa was the trending news on social media especially Twitter at the time. 
So, for undergraduate students sharing videos of xenophobic attacks from 2008 as 
that of 2019 was part of trending on Twitter and garnering more followers. One 
participant said he did not care to verify the videos he shared on social media when 
he saw someone that someone was being burnt alive; it angered him and he shared 
it on social media but he later realised that it was from the 2008 xenophobic attacks 
in South Africa:
When I saw the video of someone who was burning; and there was someone adding 
fuel to the fire, I was angered and has to share it on Twitter. Later, I started seeing 
on Twitter that the video was from the 2008 xenophobic attacks. I deleted it and 
put up the link to where they said it is fake news.
This student was one out of many undergraduate students who found it respon-
sible to delete a misinformation posted on social media and also put up link showing 
it was fake news. This could be considered an isolated instance not the norm among 
undergraduate students in Nigeria. Another undergraduate student regurgitated 
a Nigerian stereotyping of South Africans of being lazy people who are jealous of 
hardworking Nigerians. This stereotyping happens on both sides of the divide. 
While South Africans tar Nigerians with the label of drug peddlers, Nigerians retort 
that South African men are lazy and jealous of Nigerian men, who are winning over 
their women:
If you look at a typical South African man, he is lazy, no offence…he is actually a 
very lazy person and people come into your country to help you, just like Chinese 
people come into our country to help us build airport, did we kill them?
This view correlates with one of the themes identified in the framing of 
xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa on social media, Lazy 
and ungrateful. There is a perception among Nigerians that South Africans are 
lazy ad ungrateful for the role Nigeria played in bringing an end to apartheid in 
South Africa.
On the other hand, for postgraduate students, most of them said that they only 
share contents that are verified. Hence, they did not share fake videos on xenopho-
bic attacks on Nigerians because they were unable to verify the authenticity of such 
content. The findings in this segment suggest that Nigeria youths are more likely to 
share mis-and disinformation concerning xenophobia as a form of national solidar-
ity especially when it involves the ‘mistreatment’ of Nigerians in the diaspora such 
as the incident of Xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa in 2017 
and 2019.
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Figure 4. 
Categorisation of social posts.
10. Conclusion
This chapter answers the research question: What is the motivation for sharing 
mis-and disinformation on xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa 
on social media? The chapter answered this question through an analysis of social 
media-Facebook, Twitter framing of both incidents as well through focus group 
discussions across the three dominant regions of Nigeria. The findings suggest that 
the framing of the February 2017 xenophobic outbreak in South Africa was based 
mis-and disinformation and reproduction of stereotypes on social media platforms 
(see Figure 3). Alternative facts accounted for 65% of the framing while 35% 
was based on fact. For instance, 80% of the posts on social media-Facebook and 
Twitter- framed South Africans as villains while 16% were framed as the false hero 
(see Figure 4). An analysis of the geographic location of the social media accounts-
Facebook and Twitter-suggests that majority of them are domiciled in Nigeria (see 
Figure 1). For instance, 75% of the social media accounts are resident in Nigeria 
and relied on secondary sources, to frame xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living 
in South Africa; 13% are resident in South Africa and 7% are resident in America 
(see Figure 1). Consequently, the framing of the xenophobic attacks on Nigerians 
living in South Africa in 2017 and 2019 were based on rumours, untruths, mis-
and disinformation emanating from the Nigerian rumour mill. Also, analysis of 
interview suggests that there is a general consensus among Nigerians that sharing 
mis-and disinformation about xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South 
Africa amount to some form of national solidarity; a show of patriotism to save 
Figure 3. 
Category of social media posts.
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Nigerians from the dangers of living in South Africa. This point is validated across 
the three dominant regions of Nigeria as well as among undergraduate students. 
Consequently, this results in reprisal attacks and diplomatic tension between the 
Nigerian and South African governments. For instance, the Senior Special Adviser 
to the President on International Affairs, Honourable Abike Dabiri rebuked South 
Africa’s Minister of Home Affairs, Malusi Gigaba’s that “it appears that Mr. Gigaba 
would rather dwell on and entertain himself with diplomatic niceties when the 
welfare of Nigerians resident in South Africa are at stake now more than any time 
in recent history. His response to the xenophobic attacks, which has now become a 
recurring decimal on Africans, most especially Nigerians living peacefully in their 
host country of South Africa was, indeed, unfortunate.”12 Additionally, the Nigerian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed up with a summon on the South African High 
Commissioner to Nigeria: “The High Commissioner of South Africa to Nigeria is 
being summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during which government’s 
concerns on this matter will be brought to his attention.”13 The findings correlate 
with Chenzi’s [4] that mis-and disinformation about xenophobia on social media 
is a leading factor for reprisal attacks on South African businesses in Nigeria and 
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